Influence campaigns have emerged as a pressing global threat to national security, exploiting vulnerabilities in societies to sow discord and advance geopolitical interests. In Kosovo, a small state located in the heart of the Western Balkans, these efforts pose a significant challenge. Kosovo’s contested sovereignty, unresolved territorial disputes, and multi-ethnic composition create fertile ground for disinformation to amplify existing divisions, and impede the country’s progress toward peace and stability. By enhancing media literacy, fostering critical thinking, and raising awareness about the risks of influence campaigns, Kosovo can fortify its national resilience against such threats. This is essential to mitigating the impact of malign influence campaigns on Kosovo’s stability and security.
As the global environment becomes more complex, threats to national security aren’t always immediately visible. Governments are increasingly faced with multifaceted threats, which manifest in both conventional and unconventional forms. Among these, influence campaigns—often subtle and difficult to detect—represent a significant yet frequently overlooked risk.
In few places do influence campaigns pose a more acute threat than in the Western Balkans. The region’s complex ethnic and religious tapestry, coupled with weak governance, economic difficulties, political friction, and unresolved historical grievances, creates a fragile environment vulnerable to rapid destabilization. The Western Balkans is widely regarded as one of Europe’s most unstable regions, where the potential for escalation could impact both the regional and European stability. This, in turn, makes it an attractive target for both foreign and domestic actors to employ influence operations in the pursuit of maintaining influence and furthering interests.
Kosovo stands out as particularly vulnerable to disinformation campaigns due to its contested sovereignty, recent history of conflict, internal divisions, and ongoing territorial disputes with Serbia. These factors create an environment where influence operations can easily exploit existing tensions, further complicating peace efforts and threatening regional stability.
Influence Campaigns, Information Disorders, and Disinformation
Advancements in technology have enhanced the impact of harmful information and has introduced new complexities in the security domain. Malicious actors leverage the Internet and online media platforms to spread misleading and false information—information disorders—on a mass scale, aiming to influence public opinion and sway political decisions. This is also known as information influence campaigns, in which malicious actors strategically use information to achieve specific objectives.
Information disorders consist of a broad spectrum of information activities. The three main forms are:
- Misinformation: False information that is spread, without the knowledge of it being false or the intention of causing harm.
- Malinformation: Information that’s factually correct, but is shared with the intention of misleading and causing harm.
- Disinformation: False information that is deliberately spread with the intention of causing harm or securing some gain (for example, political or economic).
Disinformation is considered by many experts to be especially harmful. It often exploits and exacerbates existing vulnerabilities in a society to deepen divisions and distrust between groups or between a state and its citizens, as well as exacerbate polarization. The overarching goal of disinformation campaigns is to weaken and destabilize a target state from within.
All societies have their challenges. However, there are certain factors which make societies particularly vulnerable to disinformation campaigns. Factors such as deep-rooted ethnic and religious conflict, post-war nations, as well as political instability and tensions, set conditions where disinformation thrives. Therefore, the efficacy of disinformation is usually a symptom of a society’s inherent social and political challenge rather than the cause.
Disinformation Strategies: Strategic Narratives and Target Audience
One of the most common strategies employed in disinformation campaigns, involves some form of storytelling, i.e. narratives. Narratives are portrayals of groups, events, issues, or ideas based on relatable, familiar, or emotionally charged content that resonates with a certain group of people. When narratives are intentionally planned and strategically applied, they’re referred to as strategic narratives.
These strategic narratives then target a specific demographic or interest group with tailored content and messaging, mostly through online platforms. The efforts can target society as a whole but can also focus on specific groups based on factors such as religious affiliations or ethnic and cultural identities. When an audience is repeatedly exposed to certain narratives, it may reinforce and fortify existing beliefs and perceptions, making them increasingly challenging to counteract.
Narration has a powerful impact on how we perceive and understand our world, thereby influencing our actions. Disinformation campaigns have the capacity to undermine the shared understanding of truth and reality, creating dissonance between groups in societies and eroding trust in commonly accepted facts. Correct information is crucial, as it forms the foundation for our collective understanding of reality. In post-war areas, which may still be grappling with internal divisions, and political tensions, this can impede ongoing peace-building initiatives and the reconciliation process. Therefore, it is essential to identify false narratives and the rationale behind them, as well as understand who these narratives are targeted at.
Kosovo, with its recent war history and sensitive political landscape under international oversight, is particularly vulnerable to disinformation campaigns seeking to destabilize the region and hamper political progress.
Internal Factors and Vulnerabilities Driving Disinformation in Kosovo
Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008. Despite being recognized by over 100 countries, several key nations have yet to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Serbia continues to oppose recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty, claiming it as part of Serbia. By using both political and financial means, it aims to undermine the country’s statehood and impede its membership in international institutions. Its contested sovereignty poses a significant problem for Kosovo internationally and is also a target of disinformation campaigns aimed at delegitimizing Kosovo as a state, its government, and undermining its international relations.
Ethnic divides, especially between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, further contribute to the spread of disinformation. The country is divided into 38 municipalities: 27 have an Albanian majority, ten have a Serb majority, and one with a Turkish majority.
The Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo continue to live separately and share very little. This division is further entrenched by parallel Serbian structures, a network funded and supported by Belgrade, which operates alongside Kosovo’s official institutions. Neither ethnic group learns the language, history, or culture of the other, and interaction between the groups is many times minimal. Furthermore, the two communities continue to hold opposing views on what happened during the war 1998-1999 in Kosovo. As a result, they are largely exposed to different narratives promoting distrust of the other.
The division between the two communities is also reflected in Kosovo’s media landscape, as Albanian-language media primarily serve the Albanian community, while Serbian-language media—largely from Belgrade-sourced outlets or under the influence of Serbia—serves as the main information source for Serbian communities.
Disinformation Actors and Narratives in Kosovo’s Information Space
There are both internal and external actors who contribute to the spread of disinformation in Kosovo, promoting distrust, deepening social divisions, and distorting the perception of reality. The Western Balkans has long been a region of geostrategic interest for great powers, where both East and West compete for influence in the region. As the EU and NATO seek to expand across the region, Russia aims to retain its foothold, viewing EU integration and NATO enlargement as threats to its strategic interests.
Kosovo is targeted by disinformation campaigns from foreign actors like Russia, Serbia, and China. Russia stands out as a prominent actor spreading disinformation to destabilize the Western Balkan region, using targeted campaigns to foster anti-Western sentiment, hamper EU and NATO expansion in the region, and further Russian strategic interests. Disinformation narratives among the Serbian-speaking population focus on anti-West themes, seeking to undermine and discredit Western institutions. The EU and NATO are primarily portrayed as weak, divided, aggressive, or hegemonic. These efforts not only target Western institutions but also Western countries and figures, aiming to influence Kosovo’s relationship with the outside world.
Certain media outlets in Serbia, such as Sputnik Srbija and RT Balkan, are connected to Russia through direct funding and operation under Russian state agencies. These outlets serve as soft-power tools for the Kremlin, which disseminates pro-Russian narratives that align with Russian interests in the Balkans. The content strategically targets Serbian-speaking audiences in the Balkans, including the Serbian community in Kosovo. These Russian outlets use the Serbian language, creating the impression of being local Serbian news sources, which enhances their credibility and effectiveness among Serbian audiences.
This underscores an important point: Russian influence campaigns in Kosovo mainly target the Serbian population rather than the general population, often leveraging Serbian grievances over the loss of Kosovo. By directly targeting the Serbian audience, Russian disinformation campaigns have a more potent impact. Although traditional media play a role in disseminating information disorders, most experts consider online platforms and social media the main drivers of disinformation.
In these narratives, NATO, including its KFOR presence, is portrayed as hostile to the Serbian population in Kosovo. These narratives accuse NATO of inciting conflict, unfairly supporting the Albanian community, and posing a direct threat to Serbs living in Kosovo. NATO’s actions are framed as provocative and destabilizing, aimed at undermining Serbian interests and escalating ethnic tensions in the region.
Connected to this are narratives that portray Serbs in Kosovo as victims facing continuous threats to their safety, property, and cultural heritage. The Kosovo government and authorities are repeatedly accused of engaging in “ethnic cleansing” against Serbs and planning to expel them from Kosovo. These narratives aim to create panic and distrust in Kosovo’s institutions and government.
Furthermore, Russian disinformation campaigns also aim to strain existing tensions between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs by leveraging historical grievances, Kosovo’s contested status, and ethnic divisions. Because Russia is culturally, religiously, and historically tied to Serbia and Serb-dominated areas in the Western Balkans, including in Kosovo, there are strong pro-Russian sentiments in these communities. This facilitates the spread of Russian disinformation narratives and resonates more readily with audiences who share cultural and ideological connections.
This could potentially become a significant security concern. If the Kosovo Serb population believes they are in danger from Kosovo authorities, the government, NATO, or the Kosovo Albanian population, it’s important to consider what consequences this may entail. In the context of Kosovo, disinformation has the potential to escalate an already tense situation.
Domestic actors, including political parties, religious groups, and media outlets, also play a significant role in spreading disinformation in Kosovo, manipulating narratives to serve their own interests. These actors are often overlooked in favor of external malicious actors. NDI media monitoring, for example, found that false information, foreign influence, and inflammatory language were common in Kosovo’s media environment. Facebook, the most widely used social media platform in Kosovo, contained one of the highest instances of information disorders. Political leaders, their parties, and their supporters have increasingly turned to Facebook, including party-affiliated groups, to launch baseless attacks on each other and contribute to the creation and dissemination of information disorders. This social media activity has contributed to the spread of divisive and often unverified claims, further heightened political tensions.
Among the Kosovo Albanian population, disinformation narratives have been identified which suggest that NATO and the EU favor Serbia over Kosovo, portraying international diplomatic and military actions as biased against Albanians and undermining trust in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. These narratives also question the sincerity of EU and US support, suggesting that Western involvement is purely for geopolitical interests and not genuinely aligned with Albanian aspirations for independence. Additionally, narratives with anti-Serbian messages, aimed at deepening ethnic divisions and polarization, emphasize historical grievances and alleged threats from Serb communities.
In 2024, the second edition of The Vulnerability Index of Disinformation in Kosovo was published as an extension of the 2022 edition. The study assesses Kosovo’s vulnerability to disinformation on a measurable scale by evaluating the current situation and pinpointing primary factors contributing to the situation. The 2024 edition indicated vulnerabilities in all five measured domains—inter-ethnic relations, gender-based disinformation, the political landscape, media landscape, and public perception—along with increased vulnerability since the first edition.
Both studies show that Kosovo’s institutions face challenges in effectively handling foreign disinformation, and the media environment is vulnerable to such disinformation. Public resilience to information disorders remains low, and citizens do not fact-check.
Another interesting result from the measured data is the difference in views among ethnic groups in Kosovo’s population. The study shows Kosovo Albanians tend to have more favorable views toward NATO, the US, and the EU, while Kosovo Serbs generally hold less positive opinions of these Western powers. Instead, Kosovo Serbs often view Russia and China more favorably. The study also showed that Kosovo Serbs generally have lower trust in Kosovo institutions, such as the Kosovo police.
Approaches to Strengthening National Resilience to Malign Influence Campaigns
One main point that The Vulnerability Index of Disinformation study brought to light was that the education system in Kosovo fails to educate its citizens in media literacy and critical thinking skills, thus contributing to weak cognitive resilience to disinformation and other information disorders among the population. The lack of ability in media literacy and critical thinking are key enabling factors for the fast and wide spread of disinformation, as people who aren’t able to recognize disinformation in different content pieces might contribute to the circulation of this content.
Referring to the latest Media Literacy Index report from 2023, which measures predictors of media literacy and aims to rank societies’ potential for resilience to disinformation and misinformation, Kosovo was ranked 40th of 41 countries in Europe. This is a decline from the previous year when it was ranked 39th of 41 countries in Europe. It’s worth noting that while Kosovo’s media literacy remains low, the country has a high rate of media use and internet penetration, reaching 96.6 percent at the beginning of 2024.
In addition, various reports have found that citizens in Kosovo are susceptible to disinformation and have difficulties differentiating false information from accurate information. In the study The Story of Our Lies, conducted by BIRN Kosovo (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network), public vulnerability and institutional readiness to combat disinformation were evaluated through a public opinion survey, as well as a social experiment with 50 participants from various professions, including teachers, doctors, and judges, to assess their ability to identify and address disinformation. The findings showed both general public vulnerability to disinformation and susceptibility to disinformation among public officials, as they showed difficulties in distinguishing false and true information.
There is a clear need to enhance media literacy and critical thinking abilities among the entire population in combating malign influence efforts against Kosovo. Beginning this effort by introducing media literacy classes at all levels of education will equip students with the knowledge and tools to identify information disorders and help them navigate the media landscape. However, it’s equally important to raise awareness and educate the general public in both media literacy and critical thinking in order to create greater individual and public resilience to information disorders. This, in turn, will contribute to building greater cognitive resilience, the ability to resist malign influence attempts trying to weaken Kosovo from within.
Another way Kosovo could strengthen its public resilience to information influence campaigns is by integrating it into a comprehensive, society-wide defense strategy. Several states recognize the importance of psychological defense and resilience, especially those facing frequent information influence campaigns, and have included it as part of their broader total defense strategies. Some prominent examples include the Baltic states.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have long been aware of the risks posed by foreign disinformation campaigns, especially from Russia, and have been some of the leading countries in cyber and information security. These countries have developed comprehensive measures to combat such threats, utilizing a whole-of-society approach, where the government, media, civil society, and academia collaborate to counteract and raise awareness about disinformation. All three countries have also integrated media literacy education into the school curriculum.
Estonia, for example, established the i in 2011, which has the main task of raising awareness around security threats, including disinformation, by organizing workshops and publishing materials targeted at younger generations. Lithuania has also emphasized cross-sector collaboration between the government and non-governmental organizations. A notable example is the Debunk.eu project, which focuses on the early detection of disinformation and involves a broad network consisting of state officials, journalists, ministries, IT specialists, and more.
In September 2024, the Kosovo government approved the Comprehensive Defense Program, aimed at building national resilience and enabling citizens to respond to natural disasters or armed attacks. The program focuses on seven pillars, including the protection of the information space and education for young people. A key goal is to combat disinformation by enhancing public awareness and strengthening resilience against harmful information. The Comprehensive Defense Program offers a strategic framework that can significantly enhance Kosovo’s ability to combat the growing threat of disinformation, and build a long-term resilience against influence campaigns. However, the question of how the Kosovo government’s efforts will reach all its citizens still remains, as it is evident that certain communities are affected to a larger degree by malign influence campaigns. These communities may present greater challenges for the government to effectively operate within and influence in a meaningful way.
With this in mind, it is important that there are practical tools and strategies all individuals can adopt when using the internet and social media platforms to protect themselves from malign influence. For example the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency’s four tools for recognizing and dealing with different information disorders. These measures help us critically engage with the digital information landscape, reducing our susceptibility to disinformation and manipulative content.
Although many traumas and wounds from the 1990s war remain deeply felt across Kosovo’s population, it’s important to remember that a vulnerable, divided, and polarized Kosovo affects all its inhabitants. We must recognize the danger posed by malign influence campaigns and actively protect ourselves from being swayed by these efforts. By staying informed, critically evaluating the information we encounter, and cultivating independent thinking, we can safeguard our beliefs and decisions, ensuring that they remain our own and free from manipulation.
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