It began with a meeting between Putin and Trump in Alaska. Two men walking side by side across the tarmac, smiling. It is an image that conveyed something larger than a routine diplomatic encounter. In the Russian rendering, the scene became a symbol of reconciliation: a frosty relationship replaced by a renewed promise, an old friendship thawed. In that moment, a new narrative was cast: Russia and the United States have, in fact, always been close.
Russia quickly amplified this framing, with the state-run Institute for US and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN) reinforcing and interpreting the message for domestic audiences. The institute’s role is to analyse and give ideological shape to the Kremlin’s foreign policy line. It is no coincidence that ISKRAN is the body voicing these arguments.
During the 1980s, roughly 40 percent of ISKRAN’s staff were assessed to have had backgrounds in the intelligence services. Among them were generals from the GRU military intelligence service and colonels from the KGB, all with extensive experience in active measures and subversive operations.
After the Alaska meeting, ISKRAN rapidly produced articles and media appearances fully aligned with this new framing. “The United States and Russia have been friends since the sale of Alaska in 1867, and it is now time to return to the natural order. This is to be achieved through shuttle diplomacy, in which Moscow once again reaches European capitals via Washington.”
The crescendo of this charm offensive came when Russia handed over a 386-page document purporting to be the Russian report on the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Although the dossier contains archival material, it also includes a carefully crafted and heavily romanticized narrative.
Page 317 features a hand-drawn map with a bridge over the Bering Strait and the caption: “Kennedy-Khrushchev World Peace Bridge could and should be built between Alaska and Russia, AT ONCE.” The image appears more like stage design than historical documentation. The document also gives the impression that Kennedy himself originated the idea of such a bridge.
To the uninitiated, this may appear to be a history lesson; a benevolent Russian gesture toward the United States. But the action is neither archival preservation nor an olive branch. It is a deliberate, contemporary strategy. The sketch of the peace bridge, and sentimental language of shared peace, serve a single purpose: To frame Russia’s relationship with the United States as natural, longstanding, and harmonious.
These elements form a coherent rhetorical package. The two men on the tarmac make the friendship human. The dossier offers emotion and symbolism. The think-tanks and media prime domestic audiences. Together, they produce a narrative of natural friendship, historical continuity, and a future in which Washington becomes Russia’s pathway back into Europe.
Russian actors have not limited themselves to simply delivering the JFK dossier. They actively promote the image of the peace bridge. Russia’s Special Presidential Envoy on Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation, Kirill Dmitriev, for example, has shared the image multiple times, claiming that the project would “only” cost eight billion dollars. In a meeting with U.S. Republican politician Anna Paulina Luna, the project (having evolved from a bridge into a tunnel) was also discussed. Propagandists linked to the Russian channel RT, shadow actors in influence networks such as Storm-1516, and Russian military bloggers on Telegram all echoed the idea. So too did Vladimir Solovyov, one of the most prominent figures on Russian television. Donald Trump also raised the proposal in a meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky, calling it “interesting”. The same word used by Luna in her meeting with Dmitriev.
The objective is not to build steel and concrete, but sentiment. If the United States and Russia are friends, why should Europe resist?
The romantic façade must be stripped away. The JFK dossier attempts to cast a false warmth from the Cold War onto today’s strategic map. Its message is that mistrust between the United States and Russia is an aberration. A return to trust requires only that someone open the door, and Moscow hopes Washington will be the one to open it.
The two newly rediscovered “friends” would then pressure Europe and Kyiv to accept minimal Russian concessions in an eventual Ukraine peace settlement.
At the same time, Russia’s rhetoric has shifted since the summer regarding threats to national security. The line has shifted from the previously eternal American adversary, to states that Russia normally considers part of its own sphere of interest: A troika consisting of Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland.
Together with NATO, these states are now described as the primary threat to Russia’s existence. For example, alleged “aggressive nuclear exercises” are invoked alongside political statements by Kaja Kallas and Alexander Stubb. In parallel, a narrative is promoted in which the United States is said to be manipulating Europe. The objective is the same as during the Cold War: To undermine the transatlantic link, thereby weakening Europe.
This is Russian strategy in practice. The narrative is skilfully told but substantively hollow. The historical friendship is selectively portrayed. Periods of open aggression, espionage, mistrust, and subversive activities are erased entirely. Soviet warmth toward Kennedy’s memory serves as a reference point to describe the so-called Russian–American friendship. Russia argues that the two countries previously shared grief and must now be able to agree on security and trade.
The difference today is that Moscow couples this warmth with rigid demands. Europe is expected to change its tone and accept Russian control over parts of Ukraine. Simultaneously, the Kremlin seeks to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States.
This places concrete demands on European policymakers.
First, it must be understood that the message is primarily directed towards Washington and the domestic debate in the United States. How the United States responds to this charm offensive will affect Europe.
Second, the EU must clearly communicate to the United States the dangers of embracing Russia’s false displays of affection. For instance, the impact Congresswoman Anna Paulina Luna praising the idea of a peace bridge.
Third, any shuttle diplomacy must be closely monitored. If Washington is to be the key to Europe’s capitals, there must be a European lock that opens only when basic conditions are met. Namely, the withdrawal from occupied territories of Ukraine, accountability for war crimes, and an end to systematic attacks on neighbouring states.
Peace requires more than sketches of bridges on paper. Peace requires a counterpart that actually changes its behaviour.
When archival romanticism is paired with a geopolitical manual, we must distinguish decoration from strategy. Russian shuttle diplomacy here functions as a preliminary maneuver aimed at isolating Europe, fracturing support for Ukraine, and inserting Russia as a friend into the American public discourse.
It is therefore our task to articulate what this “friendship” costs, not only on behalf of those who have already paid the price in Mariupol and Bucha, but for those who continue to risk their lives for the hope of freedom and democracy.
This article has been written under a pseudonym.
