Frihandel i media vecka 20


Britterna har i alla fall fått till ett frihandelsavtal, nämligen med Peru enligt Fresh Plaza:

”Peruvian Foreign Trade and Tourism Minister Edgar Vasquez on Wednesday highlighted the recent signing of the Free Trade Agreement between Peru and the United Kingdom. In this sense, Minister Vasquez and British Ambassador to Ecuador Katherine Ward inked the accord in the city of Quito.

Ecuadorian Foreign Trade and Investments Minister Pablo Campana and Colombian Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Laura Valdivieso also signed the agreement.

Therefore, this FTA ensures the continuity of trade flows, meaning tariff preferences to enter the British market will be maintained once the UK exits the European Union.

”The Trade Agreement between Peru and the United Kingdom is based on the one signed with the European Union in 2013. However, adjustments were made with the purpose of maintaining the commercial exchange between our countries worth over US$700 million for Peru,” the Peruvian official expressed.

It should be noted Peruvian exports to the United Kingdom amounted to over US$700 million in 2018, the second-highest result in the last 14 years. Moreover, non-traditional shipments broke a record (US$407 million) and represented nearly 60% of the total. That same year, Peru was the UK’s second-largest fruit provider. Meanwhile, the British nation is the Inca country’s sixth-largest trade partner within the European Union bloc.”

What’s Our China Endgame? frågar sig Brett Stephens i New York Times:

“My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and some would say simplistic,” Ronald Reagan told his adviser Richard Allen in January 1977, four years before he became president. “It is this: We win and they lose. What do you think of that?”

As the U.S. now girds for a trade war, and perhaps a new cold war, with China, it’s worth thinking through what our endgame should be now.

It can’t be Reagan’s.

The Soviet Union and its satellites were an apparatus of state terror, resting on an ideology of class hatred, foisted on nations that wanted no part of either. It was always a house of cards. China is not like that. It’s a regime, but it’s also a nation and a civilization, and the three are tightly woven. It will evolve one way or another, but it’s unlikely to simply collapse.

It can’t be Donald Trump’s.

The president believes that “trade wars are good, and easy to win.” We’ll see about that. He has turned a trade dispute into a test of wills, and the willingness of dictatorships to let their people absorb economic blows usually exceeds the ability of democracies to do likewise. Besides, even if Washington and Beijing could settle on new terms of trade (and, more improbably, stick to them) it would do nothing to address the broader strategic rivalry.


So what should the outlines of a wise China policy be?

China can’t be defeated. It’s dangerous to provoke and too unscrupulous to appease. But it can be countered, undermined, and enticed — a type of containment with off-ramps.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, the free-trade deal negotiated by the Obama administration, might have served as a core piece of the strategy by deepening U.S. economic ties across the region. But Trump withdrew from it in his first week of office.

Deepening military cooperation with our allies in Asia should serve as another piece of the strategy. But Trump ended large joint exercises with South Korea, has thrown shade on military ties with Japan and has yet to make major arms sales to Taiwan.

Denouncing China’s human-rights abuses and championing civil rights and religious liberty would counter Xi’s efforts to entrench a cult-of-personality regime. But Trump has been silent on the subject, and his administration shelved sanctions intended to punish Chinese officials for their mass incarceration of Chinese Muslims.

Worst, Trump is obsessed by our trade deficit with China, which has led to his tariffs. But tariffs are a tax on U.S. consumers, and the wrong tool to deal with China’s routine theft of intellectual property. Trump is falling down here, too, by failing to sanction the entities or individuals doing the stealing.

The goal of the next administration should be to reverse each of these errors. As for off-ramps, it would also help if U.S. policymakers resisted the temptation to think of China as our next great enemy. As the Canadian scholar Michael Ignatieff once pointed out (in a different context), there’s a difference between adversaries and enemies — between those whose designs “you want to defeat” and those whose very existence “you have to destroy.”

China is now an adversary of the United States. A wise U.S. policy should treat it as one. But it should also do everything possible to keep it from becoming an enemy. Generous accommodations in trade negotiations would help: The last thing the U.S. or the world needs is a wrecked Chinese economy or a humiliated Chinese public.

How do we gradually deflect and deflate the ambitions of an immense rival power, without quite bursting them? That will be America’s central geopolitical challenge for years to come.”


Anders Rehnberg, kandidat till Europaparlamentet för Liberalerna, Olle Johnsson, vice ordförande LUF Väst och Sandra Daniels, ledamot LUF Väst skriver  på debattplats i ATL Lantbrukets Affärstidning: 

”Europas jordbrukare har alltför länge hämmats av de destruktiva jordbruksstöden, som varje år kostar över 400 miljarder kronor. Frihandelns principer måste få råda även inom jordbrukssektorn för att stärka de europeiska böndernas konkurrenskraft och möjliggöra jordbrukets utveckling i andra regioner i världen.

Subventioner till jordbrukare leder till att marker som inte är produktiva brukas och då stöden baseras på areal är det de största godsen som får störst stöd. Tyvärr har protektionistiska krafter genom historien verkat för fortsatt höga jordbruksstöd.

Centerpartiet och LRF har varit en bromskloss när det talas om en mer liberal europeisk jordbrukspolitik. En förutsättning för det europeiska jordbrukets framtid är att liberala partier som Centerpartiet börjar driva en liberal jordbrukspolitik och slutar behandla branschen som ett särintresse.

Nästa mandatperiod i EU-parlamentet kommer ha stor betydelse för hur jordbrukspolitiken kommer att se ut det kommande decenniet. 2021 kommer EU:s nya jordbruksprogram, som kommer att gälla till 2027.

Liberalerna föreslår att man inför de kommande Cap-förhandlingarna helt avskaffar direktstöden och halverar budgeten för jordbrukssektorn. Vidare ska den kvarvarande hälften investeras i forskning för att utveckla det europeiska jordbruket.

Inbäddat i EU:s jordbrukssubventioner ligger även en djup orättvisa gentemot till exempel forna kolonier i Afrika. Deras egen produktion hämmas i dag av att behöva konkurrera med subventionerade produkter och höga tullar i EU.

(—)Jordbruksnäringen är en av Europas allra viktigaste och kommer även i framtiden spela en stor roll för vår framtid. Vi har inte tid att fortsätta slira i samma gamla protektionistiska traktorspår i Bryssel. Det är i en fri konkurrens med de möjligheter marknaden ger både inom landet och på exportmarknaderna som de bästa förutsättningarna ges för ett blomstrande svenskt jordbruk.”





Kategorier: Frihandel i media