USA på väg att förlora handelskriget mot Kina

Att Trump är anhängare av handelskrig är ingen nyhet. Inte heller att han menar att de är lätta att vinna. Men nu börjar USA (och världen) få facit när det gäller USA:s handelskrig mot Kina. Och allt talar för att handelskriget för USA:s del är på väg att förloras. 

Investeringarna faller och förmodligen kommer tullar kosta kring en halv procent i minskad tillväxt av BNP. Det är inte i sig ett tecken på ett misslyckande; det är ju möjligt att åtgärderna kostar nu, men kommer ge positiva effekter längre fram. Men ingenting tyder på att marknaderna räknar med något uppgång. Och medan USA har isolerats allt mer, har Kina tvärt om stärkt sina internationella positioner.

Kina ser också en inbromsning, men den antas bero på begränsningar i regeringens möjligheter att driva fram tillväxt genom stimulansåtgärder. Även en statligt styrd ekonomi är underkastad grundläggande ekonomiska lagar.

Det skriver Jason Furman, professor vid Harvard Kennedy School och ordförande för the White House Council of Economic Advisers, 2013-17 i Wall Street Journal. Han rekommenderar istället en helt annan strategi för USA.

”Market movements have also blunted some of the impact that tariffs might have had, reducing U.S. leverage in the trade war. The yuan has weakened, which offsets the tariffs by making Chinese exports cheaper. This is the inevitable result of Mr. Trump’s de facto strong-dollar policy, driven by larger budget deficits that have increased foreign demand for U.S. dollars as well as tariffs on China that have reduced U.S. demand for the yuan. Before the latest round of the tariff war, China was helping bring about Mr. Trump’s desired weak dollar by intervening in currency markets to keep the yuan strong. Yet when Beijing gave markets more latitude, the administration branded China a currency manipulator.

In January 2018 China had average tariffs of 8% on imports from the U.S. and the rest of the world. In response to U.S. actions it raised its average tariffs on the U.S. to 20.7% by this June while cutting its tariffs on the rest of the world to 6.7%, according to Chad Bown at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. China has cut its imports from the U.S. but increased its imports from elsewhere. China’s exports to the rest of the world are also growing.

(—)

The administration needs to change its strategy radically. The first step should be to work with, rather than against, U.S. allies. That means shelving Mr. Trump’s threatened trade wars against close partners, such as across-the-board tariffs on Mexico or tariffs on car imports from Europe. The U.S. should deepen ties with partners, including by re-entering the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which doesn’t include China.

The U.S. should also use multilateral organizations and international rules, bringing cases against China at the World Trade Organization, where past U.S. administrations have had a remarkable success rate. The Trump administration instead has chosen to undermine the WTO by blocking the appointment of appellate judges who likely would rule in America’s favor.
Another positive step would be to drop the shopping list. Demanding that China buy more Boeing jets isn’t a way to get Europe on our side in the trade dispute. Such a demand could also further entrench China’s statist economic model while doing little for the U.S. economy in the medium and long run.

The final change would be to adopt a consistent protocol for responding to Beijing’s national-security threats. If state-directed espionage through telecommunications equipment is a serious threat, the U.S. should address it as such and not signal that it’s willing to trade security for slightly more purchases of U.S. products. The notion that national-security concerns are merely another trade bargaining chip suggests that the U.S. is negotiating in bad faith, again making it more difficult to gain allies’ support.

These three changes would allow the U.S. to focus on combating China’s forced technology transfers, weak intellectual-property laws, biased treatment of foreign companies in antitrust law, unfair preference for domestic companies through state-owned enterprises, and many other practices about which the U.S. has legitimate grievances.”

Dessa råd är garanterat kända i Vita huset. Frågan är om Trump har förstånd att följa dom.

 


Taggar:
Kategorier: Frihandel