That the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, would focus on defense spending and military budgets was clear from the outset. Expected to follow closely behind was increased focus on the Indo-Pacific region. However, after President Trump’s decision to intervene in the conflict between Israel and Iran, along with his early departure from the G7 meeting, the heads of state from the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) countries anticipated limited opportunities for meaningful engagement and canceled their attendance. Their absence underscored the effective sidelining of the Indo-Pacific agenda. Although NATO and the IP4 reaffirmed the importance of their partnership, no new commitments or initiatives were announced—leaving the impression that plans to open a NATO office in Tokyo are shelved.
Limiting NATO’s security scope to the Euro-Atlantic region is a luxury we can no longer afford. While Russia remains NATO’s most immediate threat, the long-term systemic challenges posed by China must not be overlooked. If left unchecked, threats from China will only grow; this concern, however, was notably absent from the Summit Declaration.
It is crucial to recognize the broader geopolitical dynamics at play and the growing interdependence between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Establishing greater presence in the Indo-Pacific is essential to facilitate information exchange and deepen relationships with key partners. NATO should therefore revitalize and pursue the proposal to establish a liaison office in Tokyo.
Geopolitical shifts towards the Indo-Pacific region and why it is important for NATO
When former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg met with then-Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., he reiterated that “security is not regional, security is global,” emphasizing that geopolitical developments beyond the Euro-Atlantic region also have security implications for Europe. China’s rapid rise and expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific and globally have shifted the balance of power toward the Indo-Pacific region and East Asia in particular. For NATO, the Indo-Pacific is important, as developments in the region can directly impact Euro-Atlantic security—a point highlighted in the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.
The Indo-Pacific region holds strategic significance due to its economic and technological weight. Chinese efforts to undermine the region’s security architecture, and challenge European interests and values, pose both direct and indirect threats to Euro-Atlantic security and global stability. With its expanding global capabilities, China presents a sustained and multidimensional challenge to the international system. Moreover, the deepening partnership between China and Russia not only signals Beijing’s further strategic alignment against the West, but multiplies the security dilemmas posed by Moscow.
China’s military and economic support of Russia’s war against Ukraine may not only influence the outcome of the war – it can reshape the broader European security landscape. China’s involvement in the war also poses a significant risk of a domino effect in the Taiwan Strait. Growing Chinese military interoperability with Russia, drawing lessons from the battlefield against Western weaponry, along with expanding naval capabilities (particularly in the Arctic) presents a substantial challenge to security in both the Arctic and the northern Atlantic regions. Chinese ownership of strategic infrastructure in Europe, and its willingness to employ grey zone tactics, further underscore its asymmetric military doctrine and strategic alignment with Russia. To effectively fulfill its mandate of ensuring security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must refine its engagement in the Indo-Pacific. This includes addressing the dual challenge posed by China’s direct malign influence within Europe and its indirect contribution to European insecurity through political and material support for Russia.
Why is the Indo-Pacific Four important for NATO and what are the future prospects of consolidating the Indo-Pacific Four into a security framework
Rising authoritarian challenges to the international system calls for like-minded, democratic countries to work together to address complex global security challenges. Through integrated security, such countries can share threat perceptions, align security policies, and strengthen partnerships to enhance both regional and global stability. NATO maintains four partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily through bilateral dialogues and cooperation. These partners—Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and New Zealand—are informally known as the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4).
NATO’s partnership with the countries of the IP4 is becoming increasingly important, not only due to the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific region, but also because of the central role of U.S. engagement there. The U.S. is a key actor in initiatives such as the Quad, bilateral and trilateral defense pacts with Japan and the ROK, as well as AUKUS. Developments in the Indo-Pacific are therefore also indirectly relevant for NATO through the U.S. From this perspective, and in the interest of maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance, it is essential for NATO to understand and further engage with the security dilemmas emerging in the Indo-Pacific. This was recently emphasized by Swedish Minister of Defence Pål Jonson, who highlighted the importance of Indo-Pacific engagement for maintaining transatlantic cohesion. However, the aforementioned initiatives lack a unified framework capable of countering China’s ongoing efforts to unilaterally alter the regional status quo. Moreover, the IP4 does not yet constitute an official security framework through which deeper security dialogue and cooperation can be institutionalized.
The prospects for consolidating the IP4 into a framework for security cooperation are promising. All four countries maintain strong bilateral security and military ties with the U.S.—particularly Japan and the ROK, due to the sustained U.S. military presence in East Asia since the end of the Korean War. Australia and New Zealand are also partially integrated with NATO through the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. NATO has a unique opportunity to play a practical role in facilitating standardization and interoperability within the IP4, as well as between the IP4, the U.S., and NATO itself. This would not only enable Indo-Pacific actors to strengthen regional security, but also allow NATO to fulfill its core tasks more effectively and cost-efficiently. Moreover, an IP4 security framework would allow for NATO and the IP4 to shape the next generation of standardization together, further enhancing interoperability and collective security. Finally, closer strategic ties between the IP4 and NATO would reduce the Indo-Pacific region’s vulnerability to shifts in U.S. domestic politics, allowing the IP4 to maintain a stable and security-focused agenda, less affected by political fluctuations.
Why is Japan important for NATO and why does NATO need a liaison office in Tokyo
In recent years, Japan has undergone a significant shift in its strategic posture, moving from a doctrine of passive defense to one of proactive defense, guided by the adoption of three new strategic documents. This transformation is largely driven by Japan’s growing perception of China as its greatest strategic challenge, alongside credible threats posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia. These evolving threats have underscored the necessity for Japan to enhance its national defense capabilities and overall security posture. Japan has set a target to raise defense spending to 2 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2027, while also aiming to revitalize its domestic defense industry and deepen partnerships with like-minded countries. The key takeaway from this strategic shift is that Tokyo intends to assume greater responsibility for regional security.
Japan is the natural partner for NATO. Among the IP4 countries, Japan has the longest-standing relationship with NATO and, within the region, is one of the strongest advocates for the international rules-based order—most clearly reflected in its security concept, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” as well as its active participation in various regional security frameworks. As a G7 member, Japan plays a central role in the international community and maintains a strategic partnership with the European Union. Furthermore, Japan’s announcement to collaborate with the United Kingdom and Italy in the joint development of a next-generation fighter jet underscores its deepening alignment with Western security and defense priorities.
Tokyo therefore presents an ideal location for the establishment of a NATO liaison office. Not only is Japan one of the most pivotal actors in the Indo-Pacific region, but Tokyo also plays a leading role in advancing regional security initiatives and promoting greater stability. Japan and NATO share a common threat perception, effectively integrating their respective security landscapes. A clear example of this alignment is Japan’s unwavering support for Ukraine and its recognition of the broader implications that the war may have for the Indo-Pacific region.
Establishing a NATO presence in Tokyo would place the Alliance at the heart of the region’s key security challenges, where a liaison office could function as a vital conduit for information and coordination. This would allow NATO to expand on existing areas of cooperation—such as cybersecurity and peace-support operations—while also exploring new opportunities in defense collaboration, particularly in the field of equipment interoperability. Japan’s involvement in the joint development of the next-generation fighter jet underscores the need for more regular consultation with European partners, and a NATO liaison office could facilitate deeper access to European defense programs and initiatives.
Security is not regional, security is global – case in point
NATO is not expanding eastward—the East has already come to Europe, and we must adapt to this new strategic reality. To argue that an increased NATO presence in the Indo-Pacific would escalate tensions in the region is a fallacy. If there is one key lesson to be drawn from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it is that revisionist states employ aggressive rhetoric and do not hesitate to initiate conflict when they believe conditions are favorable. NATO must therefore work proactively with the IP4 to ensure that such conditions are made as unfavorable as possible for potential aggressors, thereby contributing to global stability. This aligns directly with NATO’s core mission. A stronger, more structured partnership between NATO and the IP4 will establish a solid foundation for long-term cooperation and guide collective security efforts in the right direction. A critical first step would be to formalize NATO’s presence in the region through the establishment of a liaison office in Tokyo.
Magnus Ander, intern at Frivärld – Stockholm Free World Forum, spring 2025.
